Suspended Attorney General Ken Paxton’s trial in the Texas Senate is finally upon us. We worked to make data related to Paxton and the trial available before the weekend, which didn’t leave much time or space for analysis. As the trial begins, here are some observations about the poll results that incorporate more detail from the data, and more context for the politics of the historic events that will unfold this week on the floor of the Texas Senate.
1. Skepticism about Paxton’s impeachment and trial remains more evident and more intense among the most conservative Texans – but not decisively so. The more intense one’s conservatism and Republican identification, the more likely one is to think that Paxton’s impeachment by the House was unjustified, and that Paxton should not be removed from office. In the recently released August 2023 poll, among those who identify as “extremely conservative,” 44% said the impeachment was not justified, and a statistically identical 43% said Paxton had not taken actions that justify removing him from office.
Category | Lean conservative | Somewhat conservative | Extremely conservative |
---|---|---|---|
Yes, justified | 44% | 28% | 16% |
No, not justified | 14% | 26% | 44% |
Don't know/No opinion | 43% | 46% | 39% |
Category | Lean conservative | Somewhat conservative | Extremely conservative |
---|---|---|---|
Yes | 34% | 23% | 16% |
No | 18% | 27% | 43% |
Don't know/No opinion | 48% | 49% | 42% |
Among those who identify as “strong Republicans” (rather than leaning Republican or “somewhat Republican”), 39% thought impeachment was not justified (21% thought it was justified), while 37% thought removing him from office was not justified (20% thought it was).
Category | Lean Republican | Not very strong Republican | Strong Republican |
---|---|---|---|
Yes, justified | 25% | 46% | 21% |
No, not justified | 33% | 17% | 39% |
Don't know/No opinion | 41% | 37% | 40% |
Category | Lean Republican | Not very strong Republican | Strong Republican |
---|---|---|---|
Yes | 21% | 37% | 20% |
No | 34% | 21% | 37% |
Don't know/No opinion | 45% | 42% | 43% |
While these results illustrate that ideological and partisan intensity are somewhat associated with support for Paxton in the trial, on both counts slightly more members of the most intense groups are withholding judgment than are supporting Paxton.
(Some will also note that, as we frequently note, the attitudes of Republican “leaners” who initially identity as independents on our surveys frequently look more like strong Republicans than the (seemingly) intermediate “not very strong” identifiers)
2. Erosion in public assessments of Paxton is evident in his job approval ratings, including among groups that are relatively more supportive of his position in the impeachment and trial. We delved in depth into this topic in the post accompanying the release of the poll. Paxton’s net job approval ratings (the difference between shares approving and disapproving) among all voters fell from an already low -11 in June to -19 in August. Among Republicans, it fell from +32 in June (51% approve/19% disapprove) to + 23 in August (46/23), and among conservatives, from +23 in June (50/27) to +14 in August (46/32). Among rural voters, his net approval plummeted from net +25 in December 2022 (53/28) to net +3 in June 2023 (36/33), then to net -1 in August (35/36).
category Approve Disapprove Don't know Apr. 2021 32% 36% 31% June 2021 33% 36% 32% Aug. 2021 35% 38% 28% Oct. 2021 35% 37% 28% Feb. 2022 32% 35% 33% Apr. 2022 34% 36% 30% June 2022 34% 39% 27% Aug. 2022 37% 38% 25% Oct. 2022 36% 39% 26% Dec. 2022 41% 37% 21% Feb. 2023 35% 38% 26% Apr. 2023 39% 35% 26% June 2023 30% 41% 28% Aug. 2023 27% 46% 28% Oct. 2023 32% 42% 25% Dec. 2023 35% 38% 26% Feb. 2024 41% 37% 22% Apr. 2024 41% 35% 24% June 2024 36% 38% 25% Aug. 2024 33% 38% 28% Oct. 2024 36% 36% 28%
Q8D Approve Disapprove Don't know Apr. 2021 60% 12% 27% June 2021 59% 12% 29% Aug. 2021 62% 12% 27% Oct. 2021 66% 10% 23% Feb. 2022 56% 15% 29% Apr. 2022 62% 10% 27% June 2022 59% 16% 25% Aug. 2022 65% 14% 21% Oct. 2022 64% 12% 24% Dec. 2022 70% 11% 18% Feb. 2023 63% 10% 26% Apr. 2023 63% 13% 24% June 2023 50% 23% 27% Aug. 2023 46% 22% 32% Oct. 2023 54% 20% 26% Dec. 2023 61% 16% 24% Feb. 2024 63% 16% 22% Apr. 2024 62% 13% 25% June 2024 61% 15% 23% Aug. 2024 58% 15% 27% Oct. 2024 58% 13% 29%
Q8D Approve Disapprove Don't know Apr. 2021 34% 25% 40% June 2021 38% 28% 35% Aug. 2021 40% 26% 34% Oct. 2021 48% 23% 29% Feb. 2022 43% 25% 32% Apr. 2022 43% 24% 33% June 2022 44% 24% 32% Aug. 2022 49% 26% 25% Oct. 2022 50% 23% 27% Dec. 2022 53% 28% 19% Feb. 2023 45% 25% 30% Apr. 2023 50% 25% 24% June 2023 36% 33% 31% Aug. 2023 35% 36% 29% Oct. 2023 34% 39% 28% Dec. 2023 50% 26% 25% Feb. 2024 46% 35% 20% Apr. 2024 50% 24% 25% June 2024 42% 34% 24% Aug. 2024 43% 26% 28% Oct. 2024 35% 37% 28%
(For Republican graphic, see the last section.)
3. Paxton can count on a comparatively high baseline of Republican belief that the investigations of the suspended attorney general are mostly political as opposed to mostly based on the facts. As Paxton attempts to persuade the jurors in the Texas Senate and rank and file Republican voters that the process that has brought him to the docket was flawed, he can tap into an evident wellspring of pre-existing views of that process. Both Paxton’s legal motions filed with the Senate prior to the trial and the public strategies of his allies (even when they disagree on the particulars) have sought to tap into their expectations that Republicans will chalk it all up to “politics” rather than the facts of the charges leveled against Paxton in either courts of law or in the by-definition political trial in the Senate. But that wellspring of attitudes is not deep. Overall, when given the wording in the graphic below, 47% said investigations of Paxton were based “mostly on the facts,” while 28% said they were based “mostly on politics” and a quarter offered no opinion.
category Total Mostly based on the facts 47% Mostly based on politics 28% Don't know/No opinion 25%
Within those overall totals, Republicans were much more likely to attribute the investigations to politics (48%) than were Democrats (10%), though more than half of Republicans in combination saw the investigations as based on facts (23%) or withheld judgment (29% said they didn’t know or had no opinion).
Category Democrat Independent Republican Mostly based on the facts 74% 44% 23% Mostly based on politics 10% 19% 48% Don't know/No opinion 16% 37% 29%
Skepticism about the fact-based nature of investigations of Paxton were consistent with the general pattern of stronger support for Paxton among strong partisans and intense conservatives, and evangelicals. More than half of those who identified as “strong Republicans” chose the “mostly politics” option (54%), as did 59% of the “extremely conservative.”
Category Lean Republican Not very strong Republican Strong Republican Mostly based on the facts 20% 36% 18% Mostly based on politics 48% 35% 54% Don't know/No opinion 32% 29% 28%
Category Lean conservative Somewhat conservative Extremely conservative Mostly based on the facts 45% 25% 17% Mostly based on politics 25% 39% 59% Don't know/No opinion 30% 35% 23%
Religious conservatives (as measured by our standard question about views of the Bible) are more divided: 39% said “based mostly on the facts,” 36% “mostly on politics,” and a quarter withheld judgment.
Category The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word. The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word. The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God. Don't know. Mostly based on the facts 39% 43% 69% 33% Mostly based on politics 36% 30% 14% 19% Don't know/No opinion 25% 27% 16% 48%
4. The latest poll results continue to confirm the absence of any public opinion data substantiating the “forgiveness” or “prior term” doctrine Paxton has invoked in his defense. In August, prior to conducting the latest poll, we wrote an extensive post looking at the underlying logic of the arguments by Paxton invoking the legal “doctrine” that holds that elected officials should not be removed from office for acts committed prior to their election to office because the official’s election by voters theoretically aware of the transgressions implies forgiveness, which that should not be reversed other elect. Without too much rehashing, this general argument intersects public opinion in its assertion that the electorate is substantially knowledgeable about the matters at hand in Paxton’s trial. One would expect Paxton’s lawyers to raise this defense in the Senate trial, given their prominence in their pre-trial motions. Paxton’s political allies continue to attack the process using these arguments in the media – for an example, see State Republican Chair Matt Rinaldi’s comments in an interview with Phil Prazan this past Sunday on the Dallas NBC affiliate’s Lone Star Politics.
Our earlier post illustrated that UT/Texas Politics Project polling provides no empirical evidence of such knowledge prior to Paxton’s election in October 2022 – or, for that matter, after his impeachment in June. Similarly, the August poll offers no evidence that attention to Paxton’s impeachment and trial increased during the summer months following his impeachment, adding to the evidence that there are little grounds to conclude that the most voters voters possess detailed knowledge of the charges leveled against Paxton.
The August poll suggested no significant increase in the share who report having heard “a lot” about Paxton’s legal troubles generally or, more specifically, the impeachment and trial. (This was also covered in our initial rollout post in some detail.) Reasons for this are likely multiple, including a crowded political news environment, a low baseline of interest in or knowledge of the Attorney General, the complexity of the multiple components of the scandals and charges surround Paxton, minimal attention to the legislature (the setting of the impeachment and trial), and general inattention during the summer months due to vacation, kids being out of school, and – well, it’s summer. The data strongly suggests that if you had already heard a lot in June, you kept paying attention and taking information in; if you weren’t, you probably didn’t start during July or August.
Category Democrat Independent Republican A lot 37% 30% 27% Some 33% 32% 42% Not very much 19% 20% 20% Nothing at all 12% 18% 11%
category Total A lot 28% Some 39% Not very much 19% Nothing at all 14%
5. While there exists a history of political connections between Paxton and former President Donald Trump and even parallels between the pair’s legal and ethical jeopardy, support for Paxton among his Republican constituents lacks the persistence of the incredibly durable support Republicans maintain for Trump. Paxton does not enjoy the unwavering support in Texas that has been a hallmark of the space Trump occupies among his following in Texas. A look at the trend in Paxton’s job approval ratings among Texas Republicans, and in Trump's job approval numbers during his turbulent presidency as well as his favorability ratings since his reluctant exit from the White House illustrate how sharply Paxton’s ratings have suffered from his impeachment in late May (from 73% in December 2022 to 46% in August 2023), while Trump’s numbers have remained remarkably consistent, despite some evidence of erosion in his favorability ratings between June 2021 and August 2023 (from 86% to 79%).
Q8D Approve Disapprove Don't know Apr. 2021 59% 11% 30% June 2021 58% 10% 32% Aug. 2021 61% 11% 28% Oct. 2021 65% 12% 23% Feb. 2022 55% 13% 31% Apr. 2022 62% 8% 30% June 2022 60% 15% 25% Aug. 2022 66% 13% 22% Oct. 2022 65% 12% 24% Dec. 2022 73% 7% 19% Feb. 2023 65% 9% 27% Apr. 2023 65% 13% 23% June 2023 51% 19% 30% Aug. 2023 46% 23% 31% Oct. 2023 50% 20% 30% Dec. 2023 58% 15% 28% Feb. 2024 61% 16% 23% Apr. 2024 61% 14% 25% June 2024 58% 14% 27% Aug. 2024 54% 13% 32% Oct. 2024 57% 13% 31%
category Favorable Unfavorable Neither/Don't know Nov. 2015 54% 31% 12% Feb. 2016 47% 41% 10% June 2016 53% 32% 13% Oct. 2016 60% 30% 10% Feb. 2017 81% 12% 6% Oct. 2020 85% 12% 4% Feb. 2021 85% 9% 7% June 2021 86% 8% 5% Oct. 2021 82% 12% 6% Feb. 2022 80% 13% 7% Apr. 2022 79% 10% 10% June 2022 76% 12% 11% Aug. 2022 76% 14% 9% Oct. 2022 82% 9% 9% Dec. 2022 75% 17% 9% Feb. 2023 79% 12% 10% Apr. 2023 78% 16% 6% June 2023 76% 16% 8% Aug. 2023 79% 15% 7% Dec. 2023 80% 13% 8% Feb. 2024 83% 12% 5% Apr. 2024 84% 10% 6% June 2024 79% 14% 6% Aug. 2024 88% 9% 3%
Poll Approve Disapprove Neither/Don't know February 2017 81% 10% 8% June 2017 80% 13% 7% October 2017 78% 15% 7% February 2018 83% 11% 5% June 2018 87% 7% 6% October 2018 88% 7% 4% February 2019 88% 8% 5% June 2019 88% 8% 5% October 2019 88% 8% 5% February 2020 87% 9% 4% April 2020 90% 7% 3% June 2020 86% 8% 6% October 2020 90% 8% 2%