The consensus of the day-one media response to Kamala Harris as Joe Biden’s vice-presidential running mate has been “historic but safe”: Historic because she is both the first black and first Asian American woman on a major party presidential ticket, and “safe” because of Harris’ more moderate profile relative to the sustained energy among Democratic activists during the Democratic primary that ultimately pitted Biden against more progressive alternatives. Whatever the adjustments required of the progressive cadres in the Democratic primary, in terms of the general election, she makes it harder for the Trump campaign’s already commenced (and sure to continue) red-baiting smears to stick among the increasingly narrow band of undecided voters.
Biden’s selection of Harris rightly is being taken as a sign of a decisive shift in the Democratic Party that has been a long time coming. The party is majority female and majority people of color. Democrats twice elected an African American president, and nominated the first female presidential candidate of a major party in American history. Both Hillary Clinton’s nomination in 2016 and Harris’s in 2020 mark a clear and decisive trajectory. It’s hard not to take advantage of hindsight and note that Hillary Clinton’s selection of Tim Kaine four years ago reflected in part a failure to acknowledge the characteristics of the base the party needed to mobilize. Donald Trump’s inflammatory appeal to the still-large bloc of voters specifically fearful and hostile toward the changes represented by the empowerment of women and people of color in society and in political institutions was cooled not at all by Kaine’s presence on the ticket, and did nothing to inspire women and people of color to turn out for the Democratic ticket.
To the extent that Democrats’ much-discussed efforts to hasten Texas’s transformation into a consistently competitive state rely primarily on mobilizing Democratic voters, there is a lot of Kamala Harris’ demographic profile in the Democratic electorate in Texas. According to exit polling data for top-of-ticket, statewide races, non-white voters made up 58%, 66%, and 61% of the Democratic voting coalition in the last three election cycles; whites made up only 42%, 34%, and 39% in 2014, 2016, and 2018, respectively. By contrast, whites made up 80% of the Republican vote share in 2014, 75% in 2016, and 73% in 2018.
So the majority of Democratic voters are not white; nor are they men. According to the June University of Texas poll of registered voters in Texas, a majority of men identify with the Republican Party (51%), while the plurality of women, 48%, identify with the Democratic Party (42% identify as Republicans). This well known party ID gap between men and women understates the importance of race. Among White registered voters, 58% of men identified with the Republican Party in June, compared to 54% of women — almost indistinguishable. The Democratic Party identification gap still exists among white voters, with 38% of white women, and 26% of white men, respectively, identifying as Democrats. But among non-whites, men are nearly evenly split, with 46% identifying with the Democratic Party and 40% identifying as Republicans. Among non-white women, 61% identify with the Democratic Party compared to only 27% who say that they’re Republicans.
Exit polling tells much the same story with respect to the importance of female voters to Democratic candidates running statewide in Texas. In 2016, female voters made up 60% of the Democratic vote share and 57% in 2018, compared to 48% and 46% of the Republican vote share in those elections, respectively.
All of this is to say that Harris’ pick reflects the nature of the Democratic Party coalition, at least in Texas, to a far better extent than the party’s standard bearer does. There’s really nothing radical about the pick when considered this way; it’s one of the major reasons that Biden’s pick is the safe one from the perspective of mobilizing the Democratic vote — especially after a 2016 Election in which a slight decline in black turnout from Obama’s elections to Hillary Clinton’s attempt was widely considered a contributing factor in her failure to capture some midwestern states considered safely Democratic heading into that election.
Harris’ ethnic identity is actually the safer bet than her ideological profile among Texas Democrats. In that same June poll, 41% of Texas Democrats said that Texas’ Democratic elected officials aren’t liberal enough, in the context of an increasing share of Texas Democrats who identify as “liberal” as opposed to “moderate”, or “conservative.” Harris does little to shore up Biden’s left flank, but she is also unlikely to generate so much hostility among progressives that they fail to turn out, let alone vote for Trump. If anything, Harris’s identity shores up Biden’s reluctant acceptance by progressives. After all, racial equity is a non-trivial commitment of the progressive wing, especially in a moment of elevated anti-racism — and despite her prosecutorial history, Harris’s record is far from devoid of progressive gestures.
Poll | Liberal | Moderate | Conservative |
---|---|---|---|
July 2008 | 35% | 55% | 10% |
October 2008 | 44% | 36% | 19% |
March 2009 | 55% | 30% | 15% |
June 2009 | 49% | 34% | 17% |
October 2009 | 41% | 48% | 10% |
February 2010 | 44% | 45% | 11% |
May 2010 | 45% | 40% | 15% |
September 2010 | 52% | 34% | 14% |
October 2010 | 49% | 34% | 17% |
February 2011 | 43% | 38% | 19% |
May 2011 | 45% | 45% | 9% |
October 2011 | 54% | 36% | 10% |
February 2012 | 54% | 34% | 13% |
May 2012 | 38% | 51% | 11% |
October 2012 | 43% | 45% | 13% |
February 2013 | 52% | 34% | 14% |
June 2013 | 53% | 36% | 11% |
October 2013 | 43% | 43% | 14% |
February 2014 | 46% | 38% | 16% |
June 2014 | 47% | 40% | 13% |
October 2014 | 53% | 36% | 11% |
February 2015 | 45% | 40% | 15% |
June 2015 | 48% | 38% | 14% |
October 2015 | 52% | 37% | 10% |
February 2016 | 38% | 49% | 13% |
June 2016 | 44% | 48% | 8% |
October 2016 | 43% | 47% | 10% |
February 2017 | 44% | 44% | 11% |
June 2017 | 65% | 25% | 10% |
October 2017 | 63% | 27% | 10% |
February 2018 | 56% | 29% | 14% |
June 2018 | 64% | 28% | 9% |
October 2018 | 60% | 28% | 12% |
February 2019 | 67% | 23% | 10% |
June 2019 | 65% | 26% | 9% |
October 2019 | 50% | 33% | 17% |
February 2020 | 64% | 27% | 9% |
April 2020 | 62% | 29% | 10% |
June 2020 | 67% | 27% | 6% |
October 2020 | 63% | 29% | 8% |
February 2021 | 65% | 29% | 7% |
March 2021 | 62% | 31% | 7% |
April 2021 | 67% | 24% | 9% |
June 2021 | 62% | 29% | 9% |
August 2021 | 64% | 29% | 7% |
October 2021 | 63% | 30% | 6% |
February 2022 | 59% | 31% | 10% |
April 2022 | 60% | 34% | 6% |
June 2022 | 63% | 29% | 8% |
August 2022 | 62% | 31% | 7% |
October 2022 | 64% | 29% | 7% |
February 2023 | 60% | 29% | 11% |
April 2023 | 63% | 28% | 10% |
June 2023 | 63% | 30% | 8% |
August 2023 | 69% | 22% | 9% |
October 2023 | 63% | 29% | 8% |
February 2024 | 64% | 26% | 10% |
April 2024 | 57% | 31% | 12% |
June 2024 | 62% | 29% | 9% |
August 2024 | 62% | 27% | 10% |
October 2024 | 63% | 27% | 9% |
Most of the ongoing discussion about how the Democratic Party might improve its chances in Texas takes one of two routes. The more common discussion emphasizes the importance of attracting moderate, suburban, white voters, often women (maybe even some former or conflicted Republicans among them), apparently leaving or turned off by the GOP as a result of Donald Trump’s conduct in office. The problem with this route for the Democratic Party is that there’s little evidence for it. While this is a topic worthy of its own treatment, at the most general level, Trump’s job approval numbers in June among Texas suburbanites were right in the middle of the range within which they have fluctuated throughout his presidency.
Poll | Approve | Disapprove | Neither/Don't know |
---|---|---|---|
February 2017 | 50% | 40% | 10% |
June 2017 | 45% | 48% | 7% |
October 2017 | 46% | 48% | 6% |
February 2018 | 49% | 44% | 7% |
June 2018 | 50% | 44% | 7% |
October 2018 | 50% | 46% | 4% |
February 2019 | 50% | 45% | 5% |
June 2019 | 51% | 43% | 5% |
October 2019 | 48% | 47% | 5% |
February 2020 | 44% | 51% | 6% |
April 2020 | 49% | 46% | 7% |
June 2020 | 48% | 49% | 4% |
October 2020 | 51% | 46% | 3% |
But there’s plenty of evidence that the state’s demographics are changing, and that the electorate, particularly the Democratic electorate, is changing quickly due to historically disproportionate participation rates among racial and ethnic groups. The white share of the electorate continues to decline, from 66% in 2014, to 57% in 2016, to 56% in 2018. Harris’ nomination is a safe bet based on a continuation of these trends — and while it’s fair to wonder how much it might help amidst an already polarized electorate, given these trends and the composition of the Texas electorate, this vice-presidential pick is unlikely to do any harm in a Democratic Party whose core base of support are women and people of color.