With early voting already underway for the March 1 Texas primary election, between one and two and half million Texas voters out of more than 17 million registered voters (and almost 22 million adults) will cast ballots deciding 68 out of 150 seats in the Texas Legislature with only one major party fielding a candidate for the general election, along with 11 seats in the the 31 member Texas Senate — not to mention party nominations for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Land Commissioner, Agriculture Commissioner, among others.
Turnout as a Percentage of Voting-Age Population in Five Types of Texas Elections and Presidential Elections Nationwide, 1970-2022
| category | Presidential Elections-National | Presidential Elections-Texas | Gubernatorial Elections | Presidential Primaries | Gubernatorial Primaries | Special Constitutional Elections |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1970 | null | null | 31.12 | null | 15.59 | null |
| 1971 | null | null | null | null | null | null |
| 1972 | 55.21 | 44.90 | null | 29.84 | null | null |
| 1973 | null | null | null | null | null | null |
| 1974 | null | null | 19.99 | null | 19.21 | null |
| 1975 | null | null | null | null | null | null |
| 1976 | 53.55 | 46.14 | null | 21.37 | null | null |
| 1977 | null | null | null | null | null | 6.22 |
| 1978 | null | null | 25.29 | null | 21.04 | null |
| 1979 | null | null | null | null | null | 4.61 |
| 1980 | 52.56 | 45.55 | null | 19.10 | null | null |
| 1981 | null | null | null | null | null | 8.07 |
| 1982 | null | null | 29.82 | null | 14.81 | null |
| 1983 | null | null | null | null | null | 6.91 |
| 1984 | 53.11 | 47.55 | null | 15.86 | null | null |
| 1985 | null | null | null | null | null | 8.24 |
| 1986 | null | null | 29.05 | null | 13.85 | null |
| 1987 | null | null | null | null | null | 18.61 |
| 1988 | 50.11 | 44.34 | null | 22.73 | null | null |
| 1989 | null | null | null | null | null | 9.33 |
| 1990 | null | null | 31.08 | null | 18.70 | null |
| 1991 | null | null | null | null | null | 16.16 |
| 1992 | 55.09 | 47.64 | null | 17.65 | null | null |
| 1993 | null | null | null | null | null | 8.52 |
| 1994 | null | null | 33.62 | null | 12.19 | null |
| 1995 | null | null | null | null | null | 5.55 |
| 1996 | 49.08 | 40.97 | null | 14.17 | null | null |
| 1997 | null | null | null | null | null | 8.45 |
| 1998 | null | null | 26.53 | null | 8.95 | null |
| 1999 | null | null | null | null | null | 6.69 |
| 2000 | 51.30 | 44.25 | null | 13.22 | null | null |
| 2001 | null | null | null | null | null | 5.58 |
| 2002 | null | null | 29.35 | null | 10.62 | null |
| 2003 | null | null | null | null | null | 9.31 |
| 2004 | 55.40 | 46.11 | null | 9.49 | null | null |
| 2005 | null | null | null | null | null | 13.82 |
| 2006 | null | null | 26.44 | null | 6.99 | null |
| 2007 | null | null | null | null | null | 6.31 |
| 2008 | 56.90 | 45.55 | null | 23.89 | null | null |
| 2009 | null | null | null | null | null | 5.77 |
| 2010 | null | null | 25.74 | null | 11.60 | null |
| 2011 | null | null | null | null | null | 3.80 |
| 2012 | 53.60 | 43.70 | null | 11.16 | null | null |
| 2013 | null | null | null | null | null | 6.14 |
| 2014 | null | null | 24.3 | null | 11.60 | null |
| 2015 | null | null | null | null | null | 8.30 |
| 2016 | 54.70 | 46.45 | null | 22.13 | null | null |
| 2017 | null | null | null | null | null | 4.50 |
| 2018 | null | null | 42.07 | null | 13.15 | null |
| 2019 | null | null | null | null | null | 9.19 |
| 2020 | 61 | 52.39 | null | 19.04 | null | null |
| 2021 | null | null | null | null | null | 6.79 |
| 2022 | null | null | 37.06 | null | 13.86 | null |
These low-turnout primaries influence the legislature directly by being the only competitive election nearly a third of members face; they also influence the direction of state policy by shaping the agenda and actions of the state’s elected officials, as well as the campaigns and criticisms of those who aspire to office. It is also commonly understood, based on observation of the actions of legislators and other electeds, that these primary voters tend to be more extreme versions of the party overall. But little data is brought to bear on this observation other than the actions of the officials this process produces.
The most recent University of Texas / Texas Politics Project poll dutifully estimated preferences for the Republican and Democratic primaries for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General. The UT/TXP poll is a time series measuring the attitudes of registered voters, accomplishing this currently with surveys of 1,200 self-declared registered voters. However, given the low rates of Texas primary participation noted above, it shouldn’t be surprising to find that when we extract only those respondents who have a history of voting in a Democratic or Republican Primary in any of the last three election cycles from our sample, only about 16% met this criteria and also indicated in the survey that they would be voting in either party’s upcoming primary. This is not enough respondents to make reliable estimates of party primary preferences, so we “oversampled” (i.e. added additional respondents to our 1,200 person sample) registered voters in Texas with a verified history of voting in one of the last three party primaries and the stated intention to vote in the upcoming one. Combining those that naturally fell out of our registered voter sample with those in our oversample provides the basis for our estimates of Republican and Democratic Primary preferences. (For more information, please refer to our data archive for a full methodology statement.)
This sample also allows us to examine the ways in which the Republican and Democratic Primary electorates (as represented in samples of registered voters with histories of voting in these primaries and intentions to vote again) compare to the overall Republican and Democratic electorates, respectively, as of February 2022. (These are all approximations because we won’t actually know who a Democratic or Republican primary voter is until the 2022 primary election has passed. As such, these are estimates of typical preferences, in the electorate, and among primary voters.)
This examination goes into some detail, for those who don’t have the time or the patience, here are some of the major takeaways:
- While the Republican primary electorate is regularly described as more ideologically extreme than GOP voters overall, the Democratic primary electorate displays greater ideological divergence from Democratic voters on the whole, with the former more liberal than the latter.
- The Republican primary electorate does appear more ideologically extreme than GOP voters overall, but the difference between the two groups of partisans is frequently much smaller, and sometimes manifests not at all, likely due to the larger share of conservative identifiers relative to moderates in the GOP compared to the shares of liberals and moderates in the Texas Democratic Party.
- Primary voters in both parties are more engaged with politics, and express a greater attachment to their party than do partisan registered voters.
- Both parties’ primary electorates skew older than either party’s overall set of partisan identifiers.
- While the Republican primary electorate is disproportionately white compared to all Republican voters, the party itself is already overwhelmingly white, making the divergence greater among Democrats, who have a majority non-white party in the Texas electorate, but a majority white electorate when it comes to picking candidates in the primaries
The table of contents below allows you to jump to particular sections of interest, or to jump ahead for quick reference:
February 2022 University of Texas / Texas Politics Project Republican Primary Estimates
Republican Party Primary Demographic Composition, Engagement, and Ideology
GOP Attitudes toward elected officials
GOP Attitudes toward issues
February 2022 University of Texas / Texas Politics Project Democratic Primary Estimates
Democratic Party Demographic Composition, Engagement, and Ideology
Democratic Attitudes toward elected officials
Democratic Attitudes toward issues
February 2022 University of Texas / Texas Politics Project Republican Primary Estimates
| category | Total |
|---|---|
| Greg Abbott | 60% |
| Allen West | 15% |
| Don Huffines | 14% |
| Rick Perry | 5% |
| Chad Prather | 3% |
| Kandy Kaye Horn | 1% |
| Someone else | 2% |
| category | Total |
|---|---|
| Dan Patrick | 82% |
| Daniel Miller | 6% |
| Zach Vance | 4% |
| Trayce Bradford | 2% |
| Aaron Sorrells | 2% |
| Todd M. Bullis | 1% |
| Someone else | 3% |
| category | Total |
|---|---|
| Ken Paxton | 47% |
| George P. Bush | 21% |
| Eva Guzman | 16% |
| Louie Gohmert | 15% |
| Someone else | 1% |
Republican Party Primary Demographic Composition, Engagement, and Ideology
While Texas has a younger than average population compared to the country as a whole, Republican primary voters skew older than both registered voters and the overall GOP electorate. In this survey, 31% of Republicans said that they were over the age of 65 compared to 46% of GOP primary voters. And while 55% of registered voters identify as white, this is true of 72% of registered Republicans, and 87% of GOP primary voters. Educationally, the Republican primary electorate is not terribly distinct from the overall Republican electorate.
Examining where GOP ballots are cast, the Republican primary electorate is disproportionately rural, or at least non-urban, compared to statewide voting patterns. In the 2020 Texas Elections, 44% of the all votes cast in the presidential election came from one of the Big 6 metropolitan counties in Texas (Bexar, Dallas, El Paso, Harris, Tarrant, and Travis). By comparison, 33% of Donald Trump’s general election vote came from one of those counties, along with only 27% of the total GOP votes cast in the 2020 primary.
Despite the fact that Donald Trump was running as the incumbent president in 2020, this pattern holds looking back at prior elections. In 2018, 45% of the general election votes came from a Big-6 county, including 34% of Cruz’s vote total. But in the 2018 GOP primary, only 29% of GOP primary votes came from Big-6 Counties. The 2016 Election shows less of a discrepancy, with 34% of GOP primary votes and 34% of GOP general election votes coming from urban counties. But in 2014, 31% of GOP primary voters cast a ballot in one of the Big 6 counties, compared to 36% of votes cast in the general election. From these data, it’s clear that participation in GOP primaries is disproportionately non-urban compared to the urban vote’s contribution to final statewide vote totals, but not overwhelmingly so.
| Election | Percent of Total Votes Cast in Big-6 Counties | Percent of GOP Votes Cast in Big-6 Counties | Percent of GOP Primary Votes Cast in Big-6 Counties |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 44% | 33% | 27% |
| 2018 | 45% | 34% | 29% |
| 2016 | 45% | 34% | 34% |
| 2014 | 45% | 36% | 31% |
Unsurprisingly, we find greater interest in politics among GOP primary voters: a majority, 58%, say they are extremely interested in politics compared with 45% of Republicans overall. Also unsurprising, Republican primary voters express slightly greater intensity in their partisanship, with 58% identifying as “strong Republicans” compared to 51% of all Republicans.
Ideologically, similar shares of Republicans and Republican primary voters (85% and 90%, respectively), identify as conservative, but 41% of GOP primary voters identify as extremely conservative compared to 31% of Republicans, while 19% of Republicans say that they lean conservative, compared to only 9% of GOP primary voters.
| Ideology | Registered Voters | Republican Party Voters | Republican Primary Voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moderate | 28% | 12% | 8% |
| Lean conservative | 11% | 19% | 9% |
| Somewhat conservative | 18% | 35% | 40% |
| Extremely conservative | 16% | 31% | 41% |
GOP Attitudes toward elected officials
The Republican primary electorate’s orientation towards the state and its elected officials is not terribly distinct from the entire Republican electorate, save for a slight uptick in positivity among primary voters most likely associated with their greater partisan intensity and the clear GOP stranglehold over most levers of government. Similar shares of Republicans and Republican primary voters say that Republican elected officials in Texas are “conservative enough” (46% / 47%); only a slightly larger share of GOP primary voters say elected officials aren’t conservative enough (42%) compared with the overall Republican electorate (35%). Seventy percent of GOP primary voters say that the state is headed in the right direction compared to 63% of Republicans.
Both groups overwhelmingly approve of the job Greg Abbott is doing as governor, with slightly greater intensity among GOP primary voters (38% say they approve strongly, compared to 31% of GOP voters overall). Donald Trump’s popularity is the same among both groups, with 82% of primary voters and 80% of Republicans holding a favorable opinion (with similar levels of intensity). Dan Patrick and Ken Paxton both see significantly higher evaluations among GOP primary voters than among all GOP voters, with 25% of all GOP voters approving of the job Patrick is doing compared to 38% of GOP primary voters; and 29% of all GOP voters approving of the job Paxton is doing compared to 40% of GOP primary voters.
Both groups think that immigration and border security are the most important problems facing the state – 58% of Republicans and 69% of Republican primary voters, as good an explanation as you’ll find for the nearly universal presence of these issues in the TV spots and stump speeches of GOP candidates up and down the ballot.
The only attitudes more ubiquitous across both groups of voters is their dissatisfaction with the current occupant to the White House. Eighty-two percent of Republican voters and 92% of GOP primary voters strongly disapprove of the job Joe Biden is doing as president.
Nearly half of Texas voters (43%) say that COVID is still a significant crisis, compared to 19% of Republican voters, and only 10% of GOP primary voters. Similarly, the majority of voters support requiring masking indoors (62%) and in schools (61%), compared to 33% and 32% of Republicans and 20% and 18% of GOP primary voters.
On the current crop of public education issues, there is a smaller gap in the attitudes of Republicans and Republican primary voters. A majority of GOP primary voters, 59%, don’t believe that parents have enough say in their children’s education in public schools, compared to 53% of Republican voters, and 41% of all voters. A plurality of GOP primary voters (46%) support efforts to remove books from public school libraries, compared to 41% of Republican voters, and only 29% of all registered voters. While 42% of both GOP primary voters and Republican voters support limiting the use of teaching materials that emphasize racism, 47% of GOP voters and 46% of GOP primary voters oppose these efforts.
On other key issues that were the subjects of aggressive Republican action during the 2021 legislative session, we see varied patterns, though more convergence than divergence for most issues:
- On abortion: 59% of GOP primary voters support automatically revoking all abortion access should the Supreme Court overturn Roe v. Wade, compared to 53% of all GOP voters, and only 34% of all registered voters.
- On guns: both groups of Republicans are largely indistinguishable, with a slightly higher share of GOP primary voters wanting gun control laws left as they are now compared to all Republican voters (64% vs. 57%), and a slightly higher share of all GOP voters (16%) wanting laws made more strict compared with GOP primary voters (11%).
- On border security spending: state spending on border security find largely similar views, with approximately 60% of each group wanting the state to spend more on border security.
- On the 2020 election: 75% of GOP primary voters and 67% of all Republicans say that Joe Biden did not win the election legitimately, with 71% of primary voters and 62% of all Republicans saying that they disagree with the statement: “Protesters who entered the United States Capitol last January 6th were attempting to overturn the results of the 2020 election.” Unsurprisingly, both groups hold similar attitudes towards voting rules, with a majority or near majority of each wanting voting rules in Texas made more strict.
February 2022 University of Texas / Texas Politics Project Democratic Primary Estimates
| category | Total |
|---|---|
| Beto O'Rourke | 93% |
| Joy Diaz | 2% |
| Inocencio "Inno" Barrientez | 2% |
| Michael Cooper | 1% |
| Rich Wakeland | 1% |
| Someone else | 1% |
| category | Total |
|---|---|
| Mike Collier | 46% |
| Michelle Beckley | 27% |
| Carla Brailey | 23% |
| Someone else | 4% |
| category | Total |
|---|---|
| Rochelle Garza | 41% |
| Joe Jaworski | 24% |
| Lee Merritt | 15% |
| Mike Fields | 11% |
| S. "T-Bone" Raynor | 6% |
| Someone else | 3% |
Democratic Party Demographic Composition, Engagement, and Ideology
Like the Republican Primary electorate, the Democratic Primary electorate skews older than the overall Democratic Party, with 33% of Democratic primary voters over the age of 65 compared with 19% of partisan identifiers. Here too, reflecting differing patterns in participation rates among different racial and ethnic groups, a majority of Democratic primary voters, 58%, identify as white while a majority of Democratic partisans, 59%, do not based on the February poll results (but also buttressed by exit polling data).
The geography of Democratic primary voters, in broad strokes, looks similar to the Democratic general election electorate. In 2020, 57% of Democratic votes came from a Big 6 county, the same share as in the Democratic primary that year. In 2018, 58% of Democratic general election and primary votes came from Big 6 counties. In 2016, 57% and 56%, respectively. The 2014 election saw something of a divergence, with 58% of Democratic general election votes cast in an urban county, compared to 50% of the Democratic primary vote. Given this, the geography of the Democratic primary electorate coheres more closely to the Democratic general election electorate than is the case for Republican primary voters and the overall party.
| Election | Percent of Total Votes Cast in Big-6 Counties | Percent of Democratic Votes Cast in Big-6 Counties | Percent of Democratic Primary Votes Cast in Big-6 Counties |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 44% | 57% | 57% |
| 2018 | 45% | 58% | 58% |
| 2016 | 45% | 58% | 56% |
| 2014 | 45% | 58% | 50% |
The interest gap between Democratic primary voters and the Democratic electorate is even greater than the gap noted among Republicans, with 59% of primary voters, but only 39% of Democratic identifiers saying that they are extremely interested in politics and public affairs.
Also like Republicans, the intensity of Democratic primary voters’ partisan identification is stronger than that of the Democratic electorate, with 65% of primary voters, but only 53% of all Democrats identifying as “strong Democrats.” The gap in ideological identification is greater for Democrats than for Republicans, with 79% of primary voters, but only 59% of Democrats, identifying as liberal. While equal shares of both groups identify as “leaning liberal” (15% of Democratic voters, 16% of Democratic primary voters), 34% of primary voters identify as somewhat liberal compared to 25% of Democrats overall; and 29% of primary voters compared to 20% of all Democrats identify as extremely liberal.
| Ideology | Registered Voters | Democratic Party Voters | Democratic Primary Voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moderate | 28% | 31% | 19% |
| Lean liberal | 8% | 15% | 16% |
| Somewhat liberal | 11% | 25% | 34% |
| Extremely liberal | 9% | 20% | 29% |
This pattern is consistent with longer term trend data revealing much lower rates of liberal identification among Democrats compared to high rates of conservative identification among Republicans. The comparative dilution of liberal purity among the Democratic electorate results in a larger share of self-identified moderates in the party who are likely less driven by ideology to participate in their party primaries, leaving liberals a more prominent presence. This dynamic is expressed in larger, more consistent gaps between Democratic identifiers and Democratic primary voters in their issue attitudes than we find among Republicans. The gaps are not large enough to create consequential differences in the direction of Democratic issue preferences between the two groups, but on some issues that are ideologically polarizing, a more liberal primary electorate holds more uniform and/or more intense views than Democrats overall.
Democratic Attitudes toward elected officials
The plurality of Democratic primary voters, 49%, say that Democratic elected officials in Texas are not liberal enough, compared to 39% of all Democrats (also a plurality). These Democratic primary voters are more negative of their assessment of the state than are all Democrats, with 88% of primary voters, but only 69% of all Democratic voters saying that the state is headed on the wrong track.
The absence of a single issue that activates Democrats in the way that immigration and border security activate Republicans poses a challenge for Democratic politicians in Texas (as it does elsewhere). However, among Democratic primary voters, more than a quarter and a plurality (27%), say that political corruption/leadership is the number one problem facing the state compared to 18% of Democratic voters. Voting rights also galvanizes a relatively large share of Democratic base voters: 19% of primary voters and 9% of all Democratic voters say that voting rights is the number one issue facing the state. (Despite the subject’s presence in Democratic campaigns so far, only 5% of Democratic voters and 7% of primary voters said that energy or the grid were the number one issues facing the state.)
Democratic primary voters hold overwhelmingly favorable attitudes towards Beto O’Rourke, with 90% holding a favorable opinion and 57% saying that they feel very favorably towards the former El Paso Congressman. This compares with the favorable feelings of 75% of Democratic voters, with 39% saying that they feel very favorably.
Gov. Abbott receives a similar treatment in terms of intensity of opinion, with 91% of Democratic primary voters disapproving strongly of the job he’s doing (and 6% somewhat disapproving) compared to 65% of Democratic voters who disapprove strongly. The rest of the statewide leadership receives a similar treatment to Abbott, with 87% of primary voters and 55% of all Democratic voters disapproving strongly of Patrick, and 84% of primary voters and 52% of all Democratic voters disapproving strongly of Paxton (it should be noted that this doesn’t mean that there is much goodwill for either among Democratic voters, just differences in awareness and certainty).
There is less of a gap when it comes to the former president, among whom 99% of Democratic primary voters and 78% of Democratic voters hold a very unfavorable opinion.
Joe Biden receives the approval of 86% of Democratic primary voters (44% approving strongly) compared to 76% among all Democratic voters (33% approving strongly).
Democratic Attitudes toward issues
Similar shares of Democratic primary voters (69%) and all Democratic voters (66%) view COVID as a significant crisis as of February 2022. The vast majority of both groups support masking requirements in public places (96% of primary voters, 82% of all Democratic voters) and in public schools (96% of primary voters, 91% of all Democratic voters).
A majority of both Democratic primary voters (62%) and all Democratic voters (57%) think that parents of public school children in Texas have enough say over their children’s education. Large majorities of both groups (95% of primary voters, 78% of all Democratic voters) oppose efforts to remove books from public school libraries and oppose limiting discussions of the role of racism in U.S. history by Texas public school teachers (75% of primary voters, 55% of all Democratic voters). Here we see where a new set of related issues finds the more engaged, ideologically committed Democrats in lock-step, but the parties’ larger electorate not yet in sync on a new set of issues. Expect both campaigns to look to shape the emerging understanding around these issues as general election campaigns unfold after the primaries.
On other key issues that were subject to sustained attention during the 2021 legislative session, we see the extent and intensity of Democratic opposition, but especially high degrees of opposition and intensity of Democratic primary voters:
- On abortion: 93% of Democratic primary voters and 72% of all Democratic voters oppose banning all abortions in Texas should the Supreme Court overturn Roe v. Wade, with 90% and 68% of each group, respectively, wanting abortion laws in Texas made less strict.
- On guns: 95% of Democratic primary voters and 74% of all Democratic voters want to see gun laws in Texas made more strict.
- On the 2020 election: Greater than 90% of both Democrats and Democratic primary voters believe that Joe Biden legitimately won the presidential election, and more than 80% of each agree that January 6th was an attempt to overturn those results. When it comes to voting rules, 81% of Democratic primary voters and 58% of all Democratic voters want to see those rules made less strict.
While the grid is not an overwhelmingly salient issue among voters of either party, we do find significant differences, and for the O’Rourke campaign, lots of future work, in the perceptions that the legislature and state leaders addressed issues that led to the 2021 grid collapse. While 60% of Democratic primary voters have no confidence that the state has done anything to effectively prevent future disruptions in utility service, this was only true of 37% of all Democratic voters.